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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PROSECUTOR V. MILOMAR STAKIC,
CASE NO. IT-97-24-T 
On July 31, 2003, Trial Chamber II (Trial
Chamber) of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
delivered its judgment in the case of Prosecutor
v. Milomar Stakic. The fourth amended indict-
ment charged Stakic with genocide; complicity
in genocide; extermination, murder, persecu-
tion, deportation, and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer) as crimes against humanity; and mur-
der as a violation of the laws of war. 
Milomar Stakic (Stakic) was charged with
individual criminal responsibility under article
7(3) of the ICTY Statute. He was convicted of
extermination and deportation as crimes
against humanity, persecutions incorporating
murder as a crime against humanity, and mur-
der as a violation of the laws and customs of
war. The Trial Chamber thereby sentenced
Stakic to life imprisonment. 
Background
Dr. Milomar Stakic lived in the municipal-
ity of Prijedor in Serbia, and though he was a
physician by profession, he quickly rose
through the ranks of the local Serbian nation-
alist political groups after 1990, when the
Yugoslav Communist Party split along ethnic
lines and the former Yugoslavia started to break
up. On January 7, 1992, Stakic was elected
president of the Assembly of the Serbian
People of Prijedor Municipality, established
pursuant to a directive from the Serbian
Democratic Party (SDS) in Sarajevo, the head
of which was Radovan Karadzic. 
On April 30, 1992, the SDS seized power
in Prijedor by force and installed Milomar
Stakic as President of the Municipal Assembly,
removing the democratically elected Municipal
Assembly President Muhamed Cehajic.
Simultaneously, Stakic assumed the post of
President of the Prijedor Municipal People’s
Defence Council. In May 1992, he became
President of the SDS Crisis Staff of the
Municipality of Prijedor and continued to pre-
side over the body through various successive
incarnations. These bodies, and thus Stakic,
either de jure or de facto held extraordinary
executive and legislative power in Prijedor dur-
ing the relevant period of April 1992—
September 1993, the beginning of the Second
Yugoslav War. 
During the period covered in the indict-
ment, the army of the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina waged several attacks
against Muslim villages in the area of Prijedor,
including Hambarine and Kozarac. Although
the Serbian authorities claimed the attacks
were reactions to mild incidents of Muslim
unrest in the area, the Trial Chamber recog-
nized this as a pretext for initiating full-scale
armed conflict against the civilian population
and non-Serb paramilitary groups in the area. 
“Captured persons” from these attacks
were taken to the Omarska, Keraterm, and
Trnopolje camps set up by the Crisis Staff. The
Crisis Staff also determined who would run the
camps. Once at these camps, the majority of
Muslim civilian prisoners were denied ade-
quate food, water, and shelter. They were regu-
larly interrogated and beaten, sometimes to
death. The women were raped and sexually
abused. Conditions at Omarska camp were the
worst, with people packed in so tightly that
they would sometimes suffocate during the
night. The food was usually spoiled and meals
were often accompanied by beatings. 
Analysis
The Trial Chamber found that the mode of
liability was best described in the instant case
as “co-perpetratorship.” It established this by
considering Stakic’s association with authori-
ties in the Prijedor area; their common goal of
consolidating Serbian control of the munici-
pality; Stakic’s agreement or silent consent in
activities during and after the forcible takeover
of the municipality; the coordinated coopera-
tion between the Serb civilian authorities, the
military, the Prijedor Territorial Defence (TO),
and the police; the joint control over criminal
conduct; and Stakic’s authority as the leading
political figure during the relevant period. This
list constituted the evidence of Stakic’s acts for
the purposes of establishing his “co-perpetra-
torship.” The mental element of criminal lia-
bility was constituted by Stakic’s mutual aware-
ness of the substantial likelihood that crimes
would occur and his awareness of the impor-
tance of his own role. The Trial Chamber thus
concluded that Stakic was criminally liable for
the crimes charged. The Trial Chamber con-
victed Stakic of murder as a violation of the
laws of war. First, it established that there had
been an armed conflict in the municipality
during the relevant period. Second, it estab-
lished a nexus between the armed conflict and
Stakic’s acts. After reviewing the acts that
occurred in the Municipality, as well as Stakic’s
role, the Trial Chamber concluded that Stakic
was fully aware that large numbers of killings
were being committed in the camps he estab-
lished. In addition, the Trial Chamber found
that large numbers of killings occurred during
transports to camps and expulsions of non-
Serbs from the Municipality. Finally, Stakic’s
knowledge of the criminal acts was proven by
evidence showing that he took an active role in
the organization of the displacement of the
non-Serb population out of Prijedor.
The Trial Chamber convicted Stakic of
extermination, deportation, and persecutions
incorporating murder as crimes against
humanity. First, the Trial Chamber conclusive-
ly established all of the chapeau elements of
crimes against humanity. The chapeau ele-
ments are those that apply equally to all of the
enumerated crimes listed under the heading
“crimes against humanity.” The enumerated
crimes then each have their own elements.
Thus, the Trial Chamber concluded that there
was an attack in Prijedor, the acts of Stakic were
part of the attack; the attack was widespread
and systematic and directed against a civilian
population; and Stakic must have known that
his acts constituted part of a pattern of the
crimes directed against a civilian population
and that his acts fit into such a pattern.
The Trial Chamber found that in relation
to the murder charge, if Stakic was responsi-
ble for murder under article 3 of the Statute
(as discussed above), then he was also respon-
sible under article 5 of the statute (Crimes
Against Humanity). The Trial Chamber then
considered the extermination charge, noting
that Stakic incurred criminal liability for
more than 1,500 deaths. The Chamber noted
that it determined the massiveness of an
extermination on a case by case basis. It also
stated that each of the four considered acts—
the massacre in Room 3 of Keraterm camp;
the killing of approximately 120 persons in an
organized way in Keraterm camp; the execu-
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tions at Koricanske Stijene on Mount Vlasic
on August 21, 1992; and the Serb armed
attack on the mainly Croat village of
Brisevo—would have been sufficient alone
for a finding of massiveness. Thus, the
Chamber found that the killings were part of
a campaign of annihilation and fulfilled the
requisite element of massiveness for the
charge of extermination. The Chamber also
stated that the acts of extermination were
committed by Stakic.
With regard to the deportation charge, the
Trial Chamber found that the atmosphere in
Prijedor during the relevant period was so
coercive that the persons giving up their homes
could not be considered as having voluntarily
done so. The evidence also indicated that
Stakic took measures to facilitate the expelling
of non-Serbs from the municipality. Thus, the
Trial Chamber found that Stakic intended to,
and did, deport the non-Serb population from
the municipality. The Trial Chamber also con-
victed Stakic of persecution as a crime against
humanity, noting that some of the acts of per-
secution had been covered in the previous con-
victions. However, some acts were committed
with the discriminatory intent necessary for
persecution such as murder; torture; physical
violence; rapes and sexual assaults; constant
humiliation and degradation; destruction,
willful damage, and looting of residential and
commercial properties; destruction of or will-
ful damage to religious and cultural buildings;
denial of fundamental rights, including the
right to employment, freedom of movement,
proper judicial process, and medical care; and
deportations and forcible transfer.
The Trial Chamber found Stakic not guilty
of genocide and complicity in genocide. It
noted that genocidal intent was not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. For instance,
Stakic had not made use of hateful terminolo-
gy or made statements that specifically advo-
cated killings of non-Serbs. The Trial Chamber
noted that Stakic’s primary goal was to estab-
lish a Serbian municipality, not necessarily to
destroy the Muslim ethnic group. 
Conclusion
In this case, the Trial Chamber discussed in
new terminology the mode of liability incurred
by Milomar Stakic, using the phrase “co-per-
petratorship.” The Trial Chamber set out a
number of factors it considered relevant to
finding “co-perpetratorship,” including a com-
mon plan for Serbian domination of the
Prijedor area and Stakic’s agreement or silent
consent to activities during and after the
takeover of power in Prijedor. This mode of
liability represents a new development in the
jurisprudence of the ICTY and may be useful
for the flexibility it gives prosecutors to indict
persons on a theory of responsibility that may
not be clearly individual or superior criminal
responsibility, but somewhere in the middle. 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
PROSECUTOR V. FERDINAND NAHIMANA,
JEAN-BOSCO BARAYAGWIZA, HASSAN
NGEZE, THE “MEDIA CASES,”
CASE NO. ICTR-99-52-T
On December 3, 2003, Trial Chamber I
(Trial Chamber) of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) delivered its judg-
ment in the well-known “Media Cases,” which
focused on the use of the media to incite vio-
lence during the 1994 genocide. The three
defendants were charged in separate indict-
ments but were tried jointly. They were all
charged with genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to com-
mit genocide, complicity in genocide, and
crimes against humanity of persecution and
extermination. In addition, the ICTR charged
defendants Nahimana and Barayagwiza with
murder as a crime against humanity.
Barayagwiza was charged with serious viola-
tions of article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II,
which covers war crimes in non-international
armed conflicts, such as the one in Rwanda.
The prosecutor charged the defendants
with individual criminal responsibility under
article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute. In addition,
Nahimana’s indictment included a charge of
superior responsibility under article 6(3) for
direct and public incitement to commit
genocide and the crime against humanity of
persecution. Barayagwiza and Ngeze’s indict-
ments included a charge of superior responsi-
bility under article 6(3) with respect to all
counts except conspiracy to commit geno-
cide. The Trial Chamber convicted all three
defendants of conspiracy to commit geno-
cide, genocide, direct and public incitement
to commit genocide, persecution as a crime
against humanity, and extermination as a
crime against humanity. 
The Trial Chamber thereby sentenced
defendants Nahimana and Ngeze to life
imprisonment and defendant Barayagwiza to a
sentence of twenty-seven years, three months
and twenty-one days in prison. 
Analysis
The Trial Chamber noted first that this
case raised important issues concerning the
role of the media that have not been addressed
at the level of international criminal justice
since the trials of Nazi war criminals after
World War II. For that reason, the outcome of
this case is particularly important to interna-
tional criminal jurisprudence and the role that
the media has in instigating and perpetuating
genocide and crimes against humanity. 
Hassan Ngeze, a journalist, was the owner
and editor of the newspaper Kangura, which
was a source of information after the death of
President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda on
April 6, 1994, and during the height of the
genocide. The Trial Chamber notes that
Kangura was widely read nationally as well as
internationally. The paper was published in
Kinyarwanda (the primary Rwandan language)
and French. The Trial Chamber found that
articles and editorials published in Kangura
conveyed contempt and hatred for the Tutsi
ethnic group and particularly for Tutsi women.
The cover from an issue of Kangura, for exam-
ple, prominently displayed the question,
“What weapons shall we use to conquer the
Inyenzi (ethnic Tutsi Rwandans) once and for
all?”, with a picture of a machete. The Trial
Chamber found that this statement constitut-
ed genocidal intent on the part of Ngeze. 
The Trial Chamber found that Ngeze
helped secure, distribute, store, and transport
weapons to be used against the Tutsi popula-
tion. He set up, operated and supervised road-
blocks where Tutsi civilians were stopped and
taken to the Commune Rouge (a killing ground
in north-west Rwanda) to be killed. Ngeze also
drove with a megaphone in his vehicle,
attempting to mobilize the Hutu population to
come to CDR (a Hutu power movement
group) meetings and inciting extermination of
the Inyenzi. The Trial Chamber found these
actions to constitute instigation for the killing
of Tutsi civilians. In addition, on the morning
of April 7, 1994, Ngeze ordered the
Interahamwe (Rwandan rebel militia) to kill
Tutsi civilians and prepare for their burial at
Commune Rouge. Many Tutsis were killed in
attacks that occurred that day. The Trial
Chamber determined that Ngeze was individ-
ually criminally responsible pursuant to article
6(1) of the ICTR Statute as founder and editor
of Kangura, as well as for acts of ordering,
inciting, aiding, and abetting the killing of
Tutsi civilians. 
Also during the genocide, Ferdinand
Nahimana, professor of history and Dean of
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the Faculty of Letters at the National
University of Rwanda, co-founded a radio sta-
tion called RTLM, which thereafter became
very popular with the Hutu population.
Nahimana was responsible for allowing the
highly inflammatory broadcasts of RTLM and
admitted that he was happy that RTLM had
been instrumental in awakening the Hutu
majority against the “enemy” Tutsi population.
He considered RTLM an important part of the
“war of media, words, newspapers and radio
stations” that accompanied the bullets. The
Trial Chamber considered these statements
conclusive evidence of intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group.
RTLM also broadcasted the names of Tutsi
individuals and their families. In some cases,
these persons were subsequently killed. The
Trial Chamber found that this established a
specific causal connection between the RTLM
broadcasts and the killings and that
Nahimana’s role in the creation and control of
RTLM established his individual criminal
responsibility under article 6(1) of the ICTR
Statute. 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a lawyer and
Director of Political Affairs in the Rwandan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, founded the polit-
ical group CDR, which spearheaded the Hutu
power movement. He also co-founded RTLM
and was a member of its steering committee.
The Trial Chamber found that CDR created a
political framework for the killing of Tutsi and
Hutu political opponents by convening meet-
ings, holding demonstrations, establishing
roadblocks, distributing weapons, and organiz-
ing and carrying out the killing of Tutsi civil-
ians. The Trial Chamber found that
Barayagwiza played a critical role in planning
and orchestrating the delivery of weapons used
in planning attacks on April 7, 1994. In addi-
tion, the Trial Chamber noted that
Barayagwiza said publicly, “Let’s exterminate
them,” meaning the Tutsis, and threatened to
kill them, saying it would not be hard. The
chamber found that these words and deeds
made clear Barayagwiza’s “ruthless commit-
ment” to the destruction of the Tutsi popula-
tion. The Trial Chamber also found
Barayagwiza individually criminally responsi-
ble for his role in the creation and control of
RTLM and individual and superior responsi-
bility for instigating the acts of genocide by
CDR members. 
Conclusion
The Trial Chamber stated that although
the downing of the plane of the president on
April 6, 1994, may have triggered the genocide
that followed in Rwanda, the RTLM, Kangura,
and CDR were the “bullets in the gun.” The
Trial Chamber notes that “the gun had such a
deadly impact because it was loaded.”  HRB
Tejal Jesrani, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College





The Palestinian Authority recognizes
Israel’s right to “undertake certain limited
measures in cases of strict military necessity.”
Under the Palestinian Authority’s view, the
Barrier is a violation of international human
rights and international humanitarian law
because it is not “justified by military necessi-
ty,” contrary to the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. The Palestinian Authority asserts that the
Barrier violates the principle of proportionality
and requests that Israel be held accountable for
human rights violations. Claiming the require-
ment of proportionality would be met if the
line were built according to the Green Line,
the Palestinian Authority urges Israel to evacu-
ate Israeli nationals, rather than Palestinians,
when constructing the Barrier.  
The Palestinian Authority also views the
Barrier as an attempt by the Government of
Israel to annex Palestinian occupied territory in
violation of international law. By building the
Barrier on land in significant departure from
the Line, the Palestinian Authority’s views
Israel as attempting to expropriate land occu-
pied by the Palestinians. The damages caused
by the Barrier that the Palestinian Authority
cites include the “extensive destruction of
Palestinian homes and other property and
appropriation of property not justified by mil-
itary necessity, contrary to the Fourth Geneva
Convention.” The Palestinian Authority also
claims the Barrier is interfering with
Palestinians’ rights to work, education, health
care, and freedom of movement in violation of
the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. 
THE ICJ’S ROLE
Replacing the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the Hague-based Court
began work in 1946, under the auspices of the
Charter of the United Nations. Comprised of
15 judges elected to nine-year terms of office
by the Assembly and the Security Council, the
Court is the main judicial body of the United
Nations. The Court has the dual role of set-
tling legal disputes submitted to it by states
and providing advisory opinions on legal ques-
tions referred to it by authorized international
organs and agencies.
At present, the only bodies authorized to
submit a request to the Court for an advisory
opinion are the five main organs of the UN and
the sixteen specialized agencies of the UN fami-
ly, including the International Labour
Organization, the International Monetary Fund,
and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The Court has issued twenty-four advisory opin-
ions to date, including a ruling on the territorial
status of South-West Africa (Namibia) and
Western Sahara.
The Court issued an order organizing the
proceedings on December 19, 2003, allowing
all member states of the Assembly to submit
written statements concerning the issue until
January 30, 2004. The Court also noted that
since Palestine has been granted “special observ-
er status” in the Assembly and co-authored the
draft resolution requesting an advisory opinion,
Palestine may also submit a written statement.
All of the member states, including Palestine,
may present statements and comments to the
Court during oral hearings set to open on
February 23, 2004.  
CONCLUSION
Security and lasting peace for both Israelis
and Palestinians is of paramount importance
to both parties and to the international com-
munity. With the international support of the
Mideast Road Map, developed by the United
States, Russia, the UN, and the European
Union, Israel’s construction of the Barrier can-
not be viewed as a good-faith attempt to enter
into successful negotiations. The placement of
the Barrier in departure from the Armistice
Line of 1949 is an impediment to negotiations
for a lasting peace and security between Israel
and the Palestinian leadership. While Israel
emphatically maintains that the Barrier is tem-
porary, the expense, effort, and placement of
the Barrier imply that it is a more permanent
solution. The Court’s advisory opinion on this
issue, though not binding on Israel’s actions,
should be respected and upheld by both the
Israeli and Palestinian leadership, as well as the
international community.  HRB
Nicole Trudeau, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers the UN for the Human Rights
Brief.
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